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‘Global	Britain’:	the	trade	strategies	the	UK	could
pursue	after	Brexit
One	of	the	stated	aims	of	Brexit	is	for	Britain	to	forge	new	trade	deals	with	the	rest	of	the	world.
Linda	Yueh	(LSE	IDEAS)	looks	at	the	strategies	the	UK	could	adopt	in	an	effort	to	become	a
global	trading	hub.	Retaining	and	shadowing	existing	free	trade	agreements,	particularly	the
FTA	with	Caribbean	nations,	is	a	crucial	first	step.	Another	sensible	approach	would	be	to
offer	tariff-free	imports	of	agricultural	products	from	developing	countries.
To	be	‘Global	Britain’	and	realise	the	benefits	of	being	an	open	economy	that	has	allowed	the
UK	to	prosper	through	the	years	requires	access	to	markets	around	the	world.	Of	course,	it’s	possible	to	trade
without	specific	free	trade	agreements	(FTA)	and	instead	operate	under	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO)	rules,
but	that	would	be	more	restrictive	and	therefore	more	costly	to	export	and	import	manufactured	goods.	It’s	why
there	are	a	number	of	regional	and	bilateral	trade	agreements	being	pursued	across	the	world,	as	countries
recognise	that	there	are	gains	from	accessing	global	markets	beyond	what’s	been	liberalised	under	the	WTO.
Even	though	the	biggest	economic	entities	in	the	world — the	European	Union,	the	United	States,	and	China — do
not	have	free	trade	agreements	with	each	other,	they	are	among	each	other’s	largest	trading	partners.	This
shows	there	is	still	scope	to	expand	world	trade,	which	is	why	the	EU	is	pursuing	a	trade	deal	with	America	and
an	investment	treaty	with	China.	Indeed,	China	doesn’t	have	many	FTAs	and	its	relatively	closed	markets	are	a
perennial	source	of	complaint	by	foreign	companies.	Therefore,	how	Britain	manages	its	trade	agreements	with
the	rest	of	the	world	will	have	a	significant	impact	on	its	post-Brexit	economic	future.
Coffee	beans	growing	in	Nicaragua.	Photo:	Caroline	Gagne	via	a	C-BY	2.0	licence
The	multipolar	world	economy
Since	the	2008	financial	crisis	emerging	and	developing	countries	have	for	the	first	time	accounted	for	more	of
world	GDP	than	advanced	economies,	according	to	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF).	Mirroring	this	trend,
Britain	now	trades	more	with	the	rest	of	the	global	economy	than	with	the	world’s	biggest	economic	bloc	and	its
neighbour,	the	European	Union.
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One	of	the	reasons	is	because	that	is	where	demand	is	growing	quickly.	In	the	past	decade,	the	EU	has	had	to
contend	with	both	the	2008	global	financial	crisis	and	the	2010	euro	crisis,	which	depressed	economic	growth.	By
contrast,	emerging	economies	were	not	as	affected	by	these	crises	and	have	continued	to	grow,	becoming	more
important	than	advanced	economies	in	driving	global	demand.	As	these	economies	grow,	their	new	middle	class
consumers	will	demand	more	goods,	including	services,	which	is	a	strength	of	Britain.	Since	the	UK	is	the	world’s
second	biggest	exporter	of	services	after	the	US,	the	emergence	of	a	new	global	middle	class	bodes	well	for	both
countries.
That’s	not	to	suggest	that	a	trade	deal	with	the	EU	is	unimportant.	The	EU	is	on	Britain’s	doorstep.	With	supply
and	distribution	chains	that	permeate	much	of	international	manufacturing,	greater	trade	with	countries	that	are
geographically	close	is	expected.	The	EU	also	has	the	most	liberalised	services	sector	among	economic	blocs,
even	if	further	reform	is	needed.	The	bulk	of	the	UK	economy	is	comprised	of	services,	so	negotiating	post-Brexit
access	to	the	EU	market	of	half	a	billion	consumers	is	important.
Services	are	also	the	next	big	global	trade	push.	If	the	global	market	for	services	were	as	liberalised	as	the
market	for	manufactured	goods,	then	that	would	benefit	Britain	and	other	services-based	economies	as	well	as
the	world	economy.	This	is	what	the	European	Union	is	pursuing.	In	2013,	they,	together	with	the	United	States,
launched	the	Trade	in	Services	Agreement	(TiSA)	that	could	eventually	open	up	world	markets	for	services	trade
in	the	same	way	that	the	WTO	regime	opened	up	the	trade	in	goods.	Services	account	for	70%	of	both	world
GDP	and	the	national	output	of	the	28	nations	of	the	European	Union.	Yet,	services	comprise	just	25%	of	EU
exports.	If	TiSA	were	to	come	to	pass	and	become	adopted	as	the	next	multilateral	round	of	trade	liberalisation,
that	would	boost	growth	for	rich	economies,	including	Britain.	Thus,	supporting	TiSA	would	fit	well	with	Britain’s
post-Brexit	trade	strategy.
This	is	especially	as	the	US,	under	President	Trump’s	‘America	First’	policy	is	unlikely	to	continue	to	provide
leadership	on	this	global	trade	initiative.	China	is	also	unlikely	to	take	a	significant	lead	since	its	still	developing
services	sector	remains	relatively	protected,	especially	since	segments	of	its	financial	sector	remains	state-
dominated.
Therefore,	there	is	scope	for	Britain	to	help	shape	the	trade	regime	that	will	underpin	an	increasingly	multipolar
world	economy.	With	less	involvement	by	the	biggest	and	second	biggest	economies,	Britain,	as	the	world’s	fifth
biggest	economy,	can	play	a	leading	role	in	moving	forward	global	initiatives	such	as	TiSA.	The	UK	is	currently
supporting	TiSA	from	within	the	EU.	It	would	certainly	be	possible	for	the	UK	to	continue	its	current	engagement
on	TiSA	after	it	leaves	the	European	Union.
Trade	strategies
As	a	general	approach	to	trade,	retaining	its	current	trade	engagements	could	serve	as	a	useful	principle	after
Brexit	for	the	UK.	Of	course,	offering	support	for	services	liberalisation	would	not	be	as	involved	as	forming	new
trade	agreements,	so	the	former	is	simpler.	But,	aiming	to	retain	current	trade	relations	after	Brexit	would	be	less
disruptive	and	practical	given	limited	negotiating	capacity.
For	comparison,	the	United	States	is	said	to	have	perhaps	the	most	efficient	trade	negotiating	team	of	some	200
people	in	the	office	of	USTR	(US	Trade	Representative)	and	they	focus	on	one,	and	at	most	two,	trade
negotiations	at	a	time.	Since	Britain	would	be	leaving	some	80	FTAs	as	a	consequence	of	Brexit,	adopting	a
continuation	strategy	to	retain	these	FTAs	in	roughly	their	current	form	would	be	pragmatic.
Britain’s	newly	formed	Department	for	International	Trade	has	indicated	that	it	will	try	to	adopt	wholesale	the
existing	free	trade	agreements	that	the	UK	is	currently	party	to	as	a	member	of	the	European	Union	after	Brexit.
At	present,	the	EU	has	32	free	trade	agreements	in	place.	There	are	another	43	which	are	partly	in	place	while
awaiting	ratification.	Another	four	are	being	updated,	while	19	are	being	negotiated.
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Negotiating	some	100	trade	deals	from	scratch	isn’t	very	feasible	as	it	would	take	years	for	Britain	to	get	back	to
its	current	position.	Since	the	UK	is	already	part	of	these	trade	agreements,	retaining	them	would	maintain	the
status	quo	and	not	be	disruptive	to	businesses	which	are	accustomed	to	these	trade	regimes.	Pulling	out	of
existing	trade	arrangements	and	re-negotiating	them	afresh	would	be	far	more	challenging.
A	retention	policy	would	depend	on	its	trading	partners	agreeing	to	“crossing	out	EU,	writing	in	UK”	on	the
existing	trade	agreements.	Some	may	want	to	extract	more	concessions	from	Britain	since	it	is	a	smaller	market
than	the	European	Union.	But,	many	are	others	are	more	open,	such	as	Canada,	who	have	indicated	that	they
would	be	open	to	copying	and	pasting	the	existing	provisions	of	CETA	(Canada-European	Union	Trade
Agreement)	to	form	a	UK-Canada	FTA.
If	there	are	issues	with	these	existing	trade	agreements,	then	they	can	be	addressed	further	down	the	line	when
Britain	is	past	the	immediate	structural	changes	necessary	to	realise	Brexit	and	would	have	greater	capacity	to
re-examine	trade	relations.	This	approach	would	offer	a	‘status	quo’	transition	whereby	UK	trade	with	non-EU
markets	would	be	unchanged.
In	other	words,	right	now,	all	of	the	UK’s	trade	agreements	are	via	the	EU.	So,	if	it	retained	all	of	its	current	FTAs,
then	there	would	be	no	change	in	this	respect	on	the	day	after	Brexit	in	March	2019	since	all	existing	trade
arrangements	would	remain	in	place.	The	UK	could	avoid	a	‘two-step	change’	of	dropping	out	of	a	FTA	and	then
renegotiating	it,	which	would	entail	two	sets	of	operational	adjustments	for	British	companies	that	are	exporting	to
those	markets.
The	UK	has	already	announced	that	it	will	maintain	an	EU	trade	deal	that	allows	in	duty-free,	quota-free	imports
from	48	of	the	least	developed	countries	in	the	world,	including	South	Asian	nations	such	as	Bangladesh,	African
countries	such	as	Ethiopia,	and	the	Caribbean	including	Haiti.	It	benefits	these	developing	countries	to	have
uninterrupted	access	to	the	market	of	one	of	the	world’s	biggest	economies.	Some	small	developing	countries
rely	on	British	markets,	e.g.,	nearly	a	quarter	of	Belize’s	exports	go	to	the	UK,	while	it’s	10–20%	of	the	exports
from	Mauritius,	Gambia,	Sri	Lanka,	and	Bangladesh.	For	Britain,	it	helps	to	ensure	undisrupted	imports	after
Brexit	–	79%	of	tea	imports,	45%	of	clothing,	and	22%	of	coffee	come	from	these	nations.	The	UK	is	exploring
extending	this	deal	to	Ghana,	Jamaica,	and	Pakistan,	where	tariffs	are	already	zero	on	some	goods.
Along	these	lines,	if	Britain	replicated	the	EU-CARIFORUM	trade	deal,	which	is	the	2008	EU	FTA	agreed	with	16
Caribbean	nations,	the	UK	would	retain	cheap	access	to	imported	commodities,	including	mining	products,
minerals,	and	agricultural	products	such	as	bananas	and	sugar.	The	EU	exports	mainly	cars,	boats,	telecoms
equipment,	and	engine	parts	to	the	Caribbean.	The	trade	is	not	negligible	since	the	CARIFORUM	nations	are	the
EU’s	second	largest	trading	partner	after	the	United	States.	There	are	also	efforts	to	integrate	services	sectors.
Both	higher	tech	manufacturing	and	services	are	strengths	of	the	British	economy,	so	maintaining	the	market
access	that	the	EU	has	spent	years	negotiating	with	the	Caribbean	and	dozens	of	other	countries	would	be	a
practical	way	forward	for	Britain	as	it	contemplates	its	post-Brexit	trade	negotiating	strategy.
If	Britain	can	maintain	its	current	trade	arrangements,	then	that	would	cover	some	80	countries.	A	related	move
would	be	to	treat	the	23	countries	that	the	EU	is	currently	negotiating	with	as	ongoing	talks	after	Brexit.	In	other
words,	take	as	the	starting	point	the	already	agreed	provisions	in	the	EU	negotiations	with	countries	such	as
Japan,	India,	and	the	United	States.	Since	Britain	is	party	to	these	negotiations,	it	has	already	essentially
accepted	where	these	talks	have	progressed	to.	So,	rather	than	starting	talks	afresh,	the	UK	could	consider
adopting	the	EU	negotiating	stance	as	of	March	2019	as	the	initial	British	position	in	forging	new	trade	deals.
Of	course,	it	is	unlikely	to	be	that	straightforward.	Also,	some	of	these	trade	talks,	particularly	the	TTIP	(Trans-
Atlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership)	with	the	US,	appear	stalled.	But	there	is	also	the	possibility	that	some
of	these	nations	could	find	it	easier	to	do	a	trade	deal	with	Britain	since	it	does	not	represent	28	different	national
interests.	The	challenge	will	be	to	prioritise	trade	talks	with	Britain	since	other	countries,	just	like	the	UK,	have
negotiating	capacity	constraints	so	pursuing	several	FTAs	at	any	one	time	is	a	stretch.
Britain	as	a	hub
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The	global	economy	is	characterised	by	overlapping	regional	trade	agreements	(e.g.,	NAFTA	covers	the	U.S.,
Canada,	and	Mexico)	and	bilateral	FTAs.	This	allows	for	the	creation	of	trade	‘hubs’.	For	instance,	Mexico	is	in
NAFTA	and	also	has	a	FTA	with	the	European	Union,	so	it	benefits	from	being	a	‘hub’.	US	car	companies	that
manufacture	in	Mexico	can	sell	into	the	EU	tariff-free.	The	same	car	produced	in	America	would	be	subject	to	a
10%	tariff	under	WTO	rules	since	there	is	no	free	trade	agreement	between	the	US	and	EU.	Another	example	is
Israel.	Until	the	late	1990s,	Israel	was	in	the	unique	position	of	having	a	FTA	with	both	the	US	and	EU.	It
benefitted	from	its	‘hub’	status	since	trade	was	channelled	through	it	in	order	to	gain	preferential	access	into
American	and	European	markets.
Britain	has	the	potential	of	becoming	a	‘hub’	into	other	major	economies	given	its	deep	links	with	the	EU	and	the
US.	Should	the	UK	negotiate	a	preferential	trade	deal	with	the	EU	while	also	having	FTAs	with	countries	that	the
European	Union	does	not	have	trade	deals	with,	then	that	would	make	the	UK	an	attractive	‘hub’	for	international
trade.	Therefore,	if	Britain	were	to	agree	trade	agreements	with	countries	that	don’t	have	a	FTA	with	the	EU — a
list	which	includes	the	biggest	economies	in	the	world	such	as	the	U.S.,	China,	and	India	as	well	as
Commonwealth	countries	with	which	the	UK	has	historical	links	such	as	Australia,	Malaysia,	and	Singapore — 
then	it	could	serve	as	a	“hub”	for	trade.
If	Britain	were	to	benefit	from	the	‘special	relationship’	and	forge	a	trade	deal	with	the	US,	alongside	a
comprehensive	trade	agreement	with	the	EU,	it	would	be	in	an	enviable	position.	The	US	has	only	14	FTAs	with
20	countries.	None	are	in	the	European	region;	all	bar	three	in	the	Asia	Pacific	(Australia,	Korea,	Singapore)	are
centred	in	the	Americas	and	the	Middle	East.	As	a	sizeable	economy	with	a	well-developed	services	sector	to
facilitate	trade	and	investment,	Britain	would	be	an	attractive	hub	for	cross-Atlantic	trade.	Should	the	UK	enter
into	a	trade	deal	with	China	or	India,	then	it	would	also	be	a	‘hub’	for	Asian	trade	with	the	West.
This	is	a	big	‘if’	given	the	discussion	earlier	about	negotiating	capacity	and	the	intrinsic	challenge	of	negotiating
trade	deals,	especially	with	major	economies.	Trade	is	tied	up	with	politics,	so	what	looks	like	a	simple	deal	often
does	not	turn	out	to	be	straightforward.	Nevertheless,	realising	the	aims	of	‘Global	Britain’	will	require	a	long-term
strategic	vision	and	positioning	the	UK	as	an	important	hub	in	a	changing	world	economy.
Conclusion
None	of	this	will	happen	overnight	and	there	is	a	long	road	until	Britain’s	post-Brexit	economic	path	is	clear.	But
strategically	positioning	itself	in	the	world	trade	order	would	be	an	important	part	of	the	country’s	continued
economic	prosperity.	Continuing	to	be	a	liberalising	influence	on	global	trade	negotiations	would	be	particularly
beneficial	given	the	latest	initiatives	that	are	centred	on	opening	up	the	global	services	economy.
Pragmatically	speaking,	by	retaining	and	shadowing	EU	trade	agreements	and	ongoing	talks,	it	may	be	possible
for	Britain	to	have	trade	deals	with	over	80	countries	not	too	long	after	Brexit.	By	offering	tariff-free	imports	of
agricultural	products	from	developing	countries,	the	UK	can	also	quickly	notch	up	some	limited	trade	agreements
that	helps	preserve	cheap	access	to	foodstuffs.	With	that	foundation,	Britain	would	have	trade	deals	with	about
half	of	the	world’s	economies	which	could	serve	as	a	template	with	which	to	negotiate	further	FTAs.	In	deciding
which	countries	to	pursue,	it	would	be	advisable	to	consider	which	trade	deals	can	help	promote	Britain	as	a	‘hub’
for	international	trade.	That	would	help	make	the	country	‘Global	Britain’.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at
Medium	–	LSE	Ideas.
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